A tax on what we already own, bought with money that has already been taxed. In Italy we pay more of them than we think: IMU, car ownership tax, stamp duty on securities. The arguments for, the arguments against, what Spain, France, Switzerland and Norway do, and why the real answer is not one more tax but a new pact between the State and its citizens.
The wealth tax (patrimoniale) is being discussed with growing insistence. Every time the public accounts tighten, the word is back on the table. But before taking sides it is worth understanding what we are talking about, because in Italy a wealth tax is not a hypothesis: we already pay it, in several forms, and have done for years.
What a wealth tax is
A wealth tax hits something we already own, not what we earn. And that something, in the vast majority of cases, was bought with money on which tax has already been paid.
The clearest example is the home. To buy a property we use money on which we have already paid IRPEF (Italian personal income tax). At the time of purchase we pay again: registration tax or VAT, mortgage tax, cadastral tax. Then, for as long as the property is ours, IMU (the municipal property tax) arrives every year. Hence the objection everyone raises, instinctively: do I have to pay tax yet again on something I bought with money that was already taxed?
That is the heart of the matter. Income tax hits a flow, wealth as it is being created. A wealth tax hits a stock, wealth that has already been created. That is why it is perceived as taxation "squared", and why it divides opinion.
The wealth taxes we already pay
Anyone who imagines a wealth tax as a novelty to be introduced forgets that the Italian system is already full of them. The main ones:
| Tax | On what | How much |
|---|---|---|
| IMU (municipal property tax) | Property owned, generally excluding a non-luxury main residence | In 2024 it brought municipalities €16.9 billion, the highest level in the last five years |
| Stamp duty on financial products | Securities, funds, insurance policies and financial instruments held in Italy | 0.20% a year of the value, since 2014 |
| Stamp duty on current accounts | Accounts and passbooks of individuals with an average annual balance above €5,000 | A flat €34.20 a year |
| IVAFE (tax on financial assets held abroad) | Financial assets held abroad | 0.20% a year; 0.40% in countries with a preferential tax regime (since 2024) |
| IVIE (tax on real estate held abroad) | Property held abroad | 1.06% a year since 2024 (previously 0.76%) |
| Car ownership tax (bollo auto) | Ownership of a vehicle entered in the public vehicle register | Regional amount based on engine power and emissions class |
IMU: Italy's most famous wealth tax
IMU is the wealth tax par excellence. In 2024, according to analysis by the Centro Studi Enti Locali (a local-government research centre) of Ministry of Economy and Finance data, it delivered €16.9 billion to municipalities: around €15.5 billion in ordinary payments and around €1.4 billion from recovered evasion. In 2023 the figure was €14.37 billion.
Stamp duty on securities: the silent wealth tax
Less visible, but just as much a wealth tax, is the stamp duty on securities and financial products. It was born in its current form with the 2011 budget measures: 0.10% in 2012, 0.15% in 2013, 0.20% from 2014. For individuals there is no maximum cap: the 0.20% applies to the entire value of the portfolio, year after year, regardless of whether that portfolio has earned something or lost money. The €14,000 cap applies only to taxpayers other than individuals.
On a €100,000 portfolio that is €200 a year. Over ten years, €2,000, even in a decade in which the securities had gained nothing. That is what makes it a wealth tax in the full sense: it hits ownership, not results.
Abroad: IVAFE and IVIE
Those who hold investments or property outside Italy pay the foreign equivalent of the same taxes. The 2024 budget law raised them: IVIE went from 0.76% to 1.06%, with the stated aim of aligning it with the levy on properties held at one's disposal in Italy; IVAFE remains at 0.20%, but rises to 0.40% for products held in States or territories with a preferential tax regime.
Car ownership tax
The car ownership tax, too, is to all intents and purposes a tax on ownership: it is paid because the vehicle is registered in our name, not because it is on the road. For 2027 it has been partly reshaped: decree-law 162/2026 exempts a single year, on a single vehicle per individual, for petrol or diesel cars (hybrids included) up to 80 kW. It is a temporary measure, valid for one year only: the tax itself remains.
The precedent nobody has forgotten
Then there is the wealth tax Italians remember best of all, because it arrived overnight. Between 10 and 11 July 1992, with decree-law no. 333, the Amato government applied an extraordinary levy of 6 per thousand on current accounts and deposits, with retroactive effect. Ever since, every time the word "wealth tax" is uttered, part of the country thinks of that night. It is a political fact even before it is a fiscal one, and we will come back to it.
The arguments in favour
Those who support a wealth tax do not do so out of spite. The reasoning, in its most serious form, runs like this.
1. The current system is said to be unfair. Taxation so far has focused above all on income, and in particular on income from employment and pensions, which cannot escape. The result, according to those who propose a wealth tax, is a paradox: those who have not managed to put aside a single euro have paid a lot relative to their means, while those who have accumulated a great deal have paid relatively little compared with what they earned or owned.
2. A rebalancing is needed. If the tax system is built the wrong way, you correct it by shifting part of the burden from income to wealth. This is the underlying rationale driving the whole debate: not to tax more, but to tax differently, looking at accumulated wealth and not only at what comes in each month.
3. Wealth is concentrated, labour income is not. A tax on large fortunes, supporters argue, would hit a narrow group of people with potentially significant revenue, without touching those who live on their salary.
4. Other countries do it. True, and it is worth looking at how.
What happens abroad
| Country | Tax | Who pays | Rates |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spain | Solidarity tax on large fortunes, alongside the regional wealth tax | Net wealth above €3 million, with a €700,000 allowance | 1.7%, 2.1% (above €5.34 million), 3.5% (above €10.69 million) |
| France | IFI, a tax on real-estate wealth only, which on 1 January 2018 replaced the old ISF | Net real-estate wealth above €1.3 million | From 0.5% to 1.5%, in brackets starting at €800,000 |
| Switzerland | Wealth tax, cantonal and municipal only | All 26 cantons apply it, each with its own thresholds | Top rates roughly between 0.10% and 0.88% |
| Norway | Net wealth tax, municipal and state | Net wealth above NOK 1.9 million (double threshold for spouses) | 1.0%, 1.1% above NOK 21.5 million (2025 figures) |
Three observations.
- Spain introduced its tax on large fortunes in 2022 as a temporary measure. It was then extended. The revenue goes to the central State, and the mechanism neutralises the discounts that some regions, such as Madrid and Andalusia, had granted on the regional wealth tax. In tax matters, "temporary" is an adjective that ages quickly.
- France went the opposite way: it narrowed its wealth tax to the real-estate component alone. In 2022 the IFI applied to about 164,000 households, raising about €1.8 billion.
- Switzerland and Norway apply it consistently, with moderate rates and, above all, with stable rules known in advance. That detail matters more than the rates.
The arguments against
1. Trust between the State and citizens is undermined. Applying a wealth tax changes the relationship of trust between those who govern and those who are governed. Citizens do not feel at ease in a country where a new levy can appear from one moment to the next, where the rules can change mid-game. This is not a party-political issue: it is the fundamental relationship between the State and those who save, invest, buy a home and decide where to live. And the memory of 1992 shows how long the scar lasts.
2. The threshold can slide. Today the message is: we will only tax large fortunes; you who are not rich will only benefit. Yes and no. Because once the principle is accepted, trust is undermined anyway: today the wealth tax applies to those with more than X million euros, tomorrow to those with a thousand euros in their account. What stops it? The Italian experience is not reassuring: stamp duty on securities started at 0.10% and doubled in two years, with no cap for individuals.
3. It taxes what has already been taxed. This is the starting objection, and it remains the strongest on principle. For most Italian households, wealth is saved income on which taxes have already been paid.
4. Capital moves, property does not. Financial wealth can change country; a home stays where it is. The concrete risk is that a wealth tax designed to hit large fortunes ends up weighing mostly on those who cannot move: the home-owning middle class and small savers.
5. It also hits those who have assets but no cash. A family may own a valuable home and have a modest income. A tax on wealth does not look at the ability to pay it every year.
My position: not another patch, but a new pact
The arguments in favour deserve respect: the distribution of the tax burden in Italy really does have distortions, and those who live on a salary know it well. But the answer is not to add another tax on top of a system that already contains many.
Personally, I will always prefer an organic overhaul of the tax system, one that establishes a new pact between the State and its citizens. That relationship must be clear from the outset: who pays, on what, how much, and with the guarantee that the rules will not change overnight. And if the rules need changing, they should be changed radically, once, with a vision, not one piece at a time.
Continuing to apply patches, in my very humble opinion, produces an ugly garment, patched up and frankly unwearable. Switzerland and Norway do not teach us that a wealth tax works: they teach us that a system works when it is stable and predictable. That is where we should start again.
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Sources
- IMU revenue 2024: Centro Studi Enti Locali analysis of Siope+ data from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, reported by ANSA, 13 September 2025.
- Stamp duty on financial products: art. 13, paragraph 2-bis, Tariff annexed to Presidential Decree (DPR) 642/1972; Ministry of Economy and Finance, Treasury Department; Poste Italiane, stamp duty information notice.
- IVIE and IVAFE: Law 213/2023, art. 1, paragraph 91; FiscoOggi (Italian Revenue Agency, Agenzia delle Entrate); Agenzia delle Entrate circular no. 3/2024.
- Car ownership tax 2027: decree-law 162/2026.
- 1992 levy: decree-law of 11 July 1992, no. 333.
- Spain: Ley 38/2022; Agencia Tributaria; FEDEA.
- France: data on the IFI (Impôt sur la fortune immobilière).
- Switzerland: Worldwide Tax Summaries, Switzerland.
- Norway: Skatteetaten, the Norwegian Tax Administration, 2025 rates.